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DEGREES OF PRECARIOUSNESS: THE PROBLEMATIC TRANSITION
INTO THE LABOUR MARKET OF GREEK HIGHER EDUCATION GRADUATES
GRAUS DE PRECARIEDADE: A PROBLEMÁTICA INSERÇÃO PROFISSIONAL 
DOS DIPLOMADOS DE ENSINO SUPERIOR NA GRÉCIA
Spyros Themelis
 University of East Anglia, School of Education and Lifelong Learning
Abstract
This paper discusses the transition into the labour market among higher education graduates from 
2000 to date. It identiies a number of trends. First, this transition is protracted and not completed 
for the majority of Greek graduates until their thirties. Second, the labour market is fragmented 
along education level, place of living (urban or non-urban), gender, age and ethnic lines. Third, 
higher education does not seem to play a socially integrative role, as it does not shield against 
unemployment, emigration and precariousness. Fourth, the economic crisis has exacerbated endur-
ing problems integral to the labour market and its weak connections with higher education. The 
multiple and overlapping problems underlying the transition from higher education to the labour 
market is at the crux of the economic and political problems Greece is facing and they point to a 
ticking bomb at the foundations of the Greek society.
Keywords: labour market, Greece, higher education, precarity
Resumo
Neste artigo discute-se a transição para o mercado de trabalho de graduados do ensino superior, 
desde o ano 2000 até ao presente, identiicando-se um conjunto de tendências. Em primeiro 
lugar, essa transição é prolongada e não completa para a maioria dos graduados gregos até 30 
anos de idade. Em segundo lugar, o mercado de trabalho é fragmentado em função do nível de 
escolaridade, do local em que se habita (urbano ou não urbano), do género, da idade e da origem 
étnica. Em terceiro lugar, o ensino superior não parece preencher completamente o papel de 
inclusão social, pois não permite evitar o desemprego, a emigração e a precariedade. Em quarto 
lugar, a crise económica terá contribuído para exacerbar problemas duradouros do mercado de 
trabalho e das suas fracas ligações com o ensino superior. Os problemas múltiplos e sobrepostos 
subjacentes à transição do ensino superior para o mercado de trabalho estão no cerne dos desaios 
económicos e políticos enfrentados pela Grécia e apontam para uma bomba relógio que pode 
atingir os alicerces da sociedade grega.
Palavras-chave: mercado de trabalho, Grécia, ensino superior, precariedade
Introduction
Transition issues facing Greek graduates are 
explained through the traditional orientation of higher 
education towards the public sector (Kanellopoulos 
et al., 2003) but also through the mismatch between 
the production of graduates and the labour market 
capacity to absorb them (Karamessini, 2008; Liagou-
ras et al., 2003). Using aggregate data from various 
sources, but mainly from Eurostat and OECD, this 
paper explores these key issues and their ability to 
account for transition dificulties especially among 
young graduates. The indings discussed point to a 
radical shift within the labour market and employ-
ment conditions between pre- and post-crisis Greece. 
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(Standing, 2011), that is to say of the creation of 
a more lexible labour market and a workforce to 
match it. The paper’s focus is from 2000 to date, 
so it covers a suficient and almost equal amount 
of time before and after the global economic crisis 
that broke out in 2008. 
It starts with the presentation of some key 
trends regarding the overall education situation in 
Greece from the dawn of the new millennium to date 
and especially of the increase in tertiary education. 
It then moves on to discuss the employment and 
labour market changes before and after the deep 
recession it entered since 2009 and the bailout 
agreements it has signed in 2010. In the third sec-
tion, the paper discusses the repercussion of the 
transformations in the labour market for new higher 
education graduates, their prospects and alternative 
avenues to “precarity”. Finally, in the conclusion I 
discuss the implications of these indings both for 
Greek graduates but also for the country itself. 
Educating the precariat: higher Education 
access and attainment
In this section, we discuss the evolution of 
higher education (HE) access and attainment in 
Greece (approximately from the new millennium up 
to the present) in order to highlight differences in 
key indicators but also to report on any progress that 
might have been achieved before and after the crisis.
Before the crisis, education attainment in the 
wider population was rapidly improving. Between 
1997 and 2009 alone, higher education graduates 
in the 25-64 year-old group increased by 8% (from 
16% to 24%), upper secondary school qualiication 
holders by 9% (from 29% to 38%) and non-comple-
tion rates for upper secondary education reduced by 
17% (from 56% to 39%) (OECD, 2011). Although 
HE attainment rates for the overall population con-
tinued to rise during the years of the crisis, the pace 
of increase was slower than before. In 2015, 28% 
of 25-64 year olds held a qualiication equivalent 
to a degree or higher1 (OECD, 2015). Expectedly, 
HE attainment rates improved somewhat more 
rapidly for the 25-34 year-old group with much of 
the improvement taking place after 2009 (the year 
held to coincide with the onset of the Greek crisis). 
However, HE rates were already low (23,9% in 2000, 
compared to 25,9% for the OECD countries) leaving, 
therefore, a lot of room for improvement. Indeed, 
the expansion of Greek HE that has been realised 
after 2009 beneited the 25-34 year-olds more than 
any other age group. Despite the deep recession, as 
of 2015, Greece managed to meet its HE attainment 
target of 40%. In 2015, 40,1% of the said group 
were in HE, marking a steep increase by over 16% 
in the 2000-2015 period and placing Greece beyond 
the European Union average (38,7%)2. Despite the 
marked progress in accessing HE, Greece still has 
one of the lowest completion rates among its EU 
and OECD counterparts. In 2000 completions stood 
at 54% with an OECD and EU average of 76% and 
77% respectively. In 2011, this rate rose to 68% 
for Greece but it was still lagging behind the EU 
and OECD average (both at 83%) (OECD, 2013).
What is more, the Greek HE system displays 
considerable inequalities by gender and country 
of origin. The gender HE attainment gap in 2015 
(10,2%) was slightly above the EU28 average 
(9,4%)3 but substantially more augmented than in 
2012 (6%). Indisputably, policies implemented during 
the crisis have had a negative impact on reducing 
inequalities in gender attainment. The same trend 
is manifest in the rest of the EU countries with the 
exception of Ireland. Inequalities of attainment 
are even more pronounced in relation to country 
of origin4. In comparison to its EU counterparts, 
Greece has one of the lowest HE attainment rates 
for non-natives, 8,4%, compared to an EU average 
of 28,6%. 
In terms of general versus vocational educa-
tion, Greece has traditionally maintained a strong 
emphasis on general education and a marginal focus 
on tertiary level Vocational Education and Training 
(VET). The latter has been characterized by chronic 
underfunding and low effectiveness of any links 
between the national education and training systems 
with the labour market (Cedefop, 2011). At any 
rate, both general education and training have been 
strongly affected by very low and decreasing public 
spending, due to the strict iscal consolidation impo-
sed since 2010. Although the ratio of expenditure 
to GDP did not alter signiicantly between 2008 and 
2013, overall spending on education decreased by 
at least 25%5 given the cumulative reduction in GDP 
of equal proportion (25%) during this time period. 
The employment and labour market 
situation of the precariat
Section one showed that the overall education 
level among the wider population, especially the 
younger ones, has increased substantially over 
the last two decades or so. But do higher educa-
tional qualiications secure their incumbents better 
employment prospects? In this section, I discuss 
some qualitative and quantitative changes in the 
employment and labour market situation of young 
HE graduates.
Cementing precarity: public versus private sector 
employment
Perceptions about employment security and 
prestige have drastically changed with the onset of 
the crisis. While in the past young graduates used 






N.º 31 (II Série, 2017)
pp. 53-62
to pursue public sector occupations, after the crisis 
their preferences, or forced choices to be more pre-
cise, have shifted to the private sector. According 
to a recent survey (kariera.gr, 2016) among the 
so called Generation Y, that is to say those born 
between 1980 and 2000, 73% prefer to work in the 
private sector, 9% want to set up their own start-up 
company and only 8% prefer to work in the public 
sector6.  The low esteem in which young adults hold 
public sector occupations is explained by the drive to 
increase lexibility at any cost and in every direction 
as attested to by the wage compression experienced 
by public servants, job loss or fear of job loss and the 
deteriorating working conditions within the sector. 
In other words, the “precarianisation” of the labour 
market has affected worse the public sector, which 
has matched and in some cases surpassed in terms of 
lexibility, instability and uncertainty in employment 
situation of its workforce the private sector.
In a drive to increase “wage lexibility” (Stan-
ding, 2011), “Greece experienced one of the largest 
falls in real wages among the OECD countries (more 
than 5% per year on average since the irst quarter 
of 2009). The private sector was hit hard by wage 
cuts (-3,4% per year).” (OECD, 2014: 1). According 
to other estimates, reduction in public sector wages 
was at least 35% between 2010 and 2013 alone. 
Even occupations which have always been associa-
ted with modest remuneration, such as teaching, 
received a pay cut of 17% only between 2009 and 
2011 (in comparison to a 2% average drop in the 
OECD countries) (OECD, 2013).
Owing to the bailout packages Greece has 
signed with its lenders since 2010, workers were 
not only to lose out on wages but their labour was 
now to be valued less than ever before: 
“the reforms have led to a dramatic decline 
of the labour cost as a result of wage cuts. The 
minimum wage has fallen by 20,8% between 
2009 and 2012, while the cumulative reduction 
of the real unit labour cost reached 12,2% 
between 2010 and 2012. Overall, the total 
contraction of the average nominal wage in 
the Greek economy for the period 2010-13 will 
reach 30%, bringing down nominal wages to 
2000 levels and real wages to 1996 levels.” 
(European Parliament, 2013: 6). 
Apart from wage contraction, public sector 
workers have been hit by pension system reforms. 
While after the crisis early retirement has been 
pursued as a route of escaping the deterioration of 
working conditions, a new system of calculating pen-
sion contributions has resulted in the vast majority 
of public workers taking a cut to their pensions and 
a net loss of future income for thousands of others 
still in employment.
The other tentacle of precarianisation, “numeri-
cal lexibility” (Standing, 2011), was implemented 
through job losses, which were brought about in 
three ways, namely through non-renewal in tempo-
rary contracts, early retirement and redundancies 
(Zahariadis, 2014). Between 2010 and 2013, it is 
estimated that the Greek state removed approxi-
mately 20% of its workforce from its payroll either 
through redundancies or voluntary retirement (from 
768,009 in 2010, to 618,709 in 2013). This number 
represents a sharp drop in the total amount of pub-
lic sector workforce, especially if we also take into 
consideration the recruitment freeze that has been 
implemented since 20107. The tough conditions in 
the public sector ought not to conceal the even worse 
situation in the private. A recent study found that in 
the 2009-2014 period, the private sector took the 
lion’s share in terms of job losses and wage cuts 
and that “employment loss in the private sector 
has been almost twice as high as that in the public 
sector.” (Christopoulou and Monastiriotis, 2016), 
further entrapping young graduates into precarity. 
The employment of the precariat
In order to appreciate the degree of this 
precarity of Greek graduates, we will intersperse 
some selected comparisons between their labour 
market prospects and those of their EU and OECD 
counterparts. Between 2003 and 2007, average 
unemployment rates among HE graduates (males 
and females aged 20-34 years) in the EU stood at 
7,1%. This rate compares favourably to secondary 
education graduates who displayed much higher 
unemployment rates (10,9%) (EENEE, 2012)8. 
Regarding employment among 20-34 year olds, the 
reverse pattern is evident. That is to say, employ-
ment in the EU was steadily rising until the onset 
of the crisis when it peaked at 82% in 2008. Since 
then, it has been decreasing and in 2013 it reached 
a low of 75,4%, before it started increasing again 
(76,9% in 2015). One of the most notable exceptions 
is Germany, where graduate employment has been 
traditionally at very high levels (79,6% in 2005) and 
rising even amidst the crisis (from 86% in 2010 to 
90,4% in 2015). 
By contrast, Greece, along with other countries 
from the periphery (namely Italy, Spain, and Por-
tugal) has been displaying higher rates of graduate 
unemployment than the EU average. Arguably, HE 
qualiications in the EU periphery do not confer high 
employment prospects to their graduates and, when 
they do, the associated advantages are marginal 
in comparison to those enjoyed by secondary edu-
cation graduates (EENEE, 2012). In other words, 
HE qualiications in these countries do not lead to 
improved employment prospects nor do they provide 
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More speciically, the employment situation 
before the crisis provided a challenging environment 
for HE graduates, who exhibited one of the lowest 
rates of employability and one of the highest rates of 
unemployment (OECD, 2011). Speciically, graduate 
employment started from a low base, but it then 
rose substantially, from 59,4% in 2005 to 68,3% 
in 2008. However, since 2009 it has been on a free 
fall and in 2013 it reached a low of 40%. Although 
the situation has been improving since then, Greece 
still displays the lowest rate of graduate employment 
among the 28 EU member states: 47,4% in 2014 
compared to an average of 80,5% for the EU28 
(European Commission, 2015: 7).
Furthermore, Greece has been grappling with 
persistent youth unemployment. Some progress 
achieved from the start of the new millennium was 
brought to an abrupt halt with the crisis. Speciically, 
between 2008 and 2014 Greece recorded both the 
highest youth unemployment, but also the steepest 
rise within that period among its EU counterparts 
(from around 23% in 2008 to over 53% in 2014). 
In addition, Greece displays one of the highest and 
sharply ampliied long-term unemployment rates 
among the OECD countries, from 49% in Q4 2007 
to 71% in Q1 2014 (OECD, 2014: 1). A discussed in 
section 3, youth and general unemployment rates 
would be even higher had it not been for emigration. 
Notwithstanding the seriousness of the effects 
of the crisis on graduate employment prospects, as 
noted above, the Greek graduate labour market was 
riddled with laws well before its onset. For example, 
graduate prospects were very uneven and dependent 
on type of HE institution (AEI or TEI9) and degree 
subject obtained. For example, immediately before 
the crisis (2004-2007), natural sciences graduates 
were the worst affected by labour market shortages 
with over 35% unemployment rate up to ive years 
after graduation (followed closely by humanities 
and social sciences graduates, which are traditional 
female destinations). Conversely, law and computer 
science graduates were the least affected by unem-
ployment (approximately 10% of them remained 
unemployed ive years after graduation).
Low economic activity in Greece predates the 
crisis, especially for women (Papadopoulos, 2000). 
What is more, even those females in the labour market 
seemed to be at risk of losing their jobs at a much 
higher rate than their male counterparts. Although 
some variation in terms of employment practices 
and patterns is observed, the “female penalty” is a 
reality in nearly all Greek regions. For example, in 
the 2005-2008 period, this penalty “ranged between 
5,1% in Athens and 12,6% in Western Macedonia” 
(Monastiriotis and Martelli, 2013: 20-21). The “female 
penalty” is also evident in relation to younger age 
groups. Speciically, female youth unemployment 
in 2016 stood at a staggering 51,4% compared to 
41,3% for males (Eurostat, 2016) which points both 
to a wide gender gap and to alarmingly high rates of 
youth unemployment. While overall unemployment 
risk worsened for both males and females after the 
crisis, it can be safely deduced that, owing to the 
larger participation of males than females in the labour 
market, this risk increased for the former much more 
than it did for the latter. Hence, the labour market 
participation gender gap looks smaller than in the 
past. However, the focus here should be on the fact 
that both males and females were much more likely 
to lose their jobs in 2016 than they were in 2009 
and not on the reduction of the unemployment risk 
gap between males and females. 
If we combine the indings from the previous 
section, then we conclude that females are more 
educated but less employable than males. Apart from 
females, non-natives have also been associated with 
less favourable rates of entry into the labour market. 
Especially after the crisis, unemployment risk and 
general labour market position for non-native born 
workers worsened in most regions (Monastiriotis 
and Martelli, 2013).
Returns on higher education qualiications
Overall, Greek graduates display the lowest 
net returns on their educational qualiications in 
the EU (OECD, 2008). Although evidence is far from 
conclusive, recent studies indicate that “returns to 
education (in terms of employment probabilities) in 
the country, perhaps with the exception of Athens 
and Thessaloniki, remain even today rather low” 
(Monastiriotis and Martelli, 2013: 19). This trend 
further corroborates a pattern of precarity among 
HE graduates, despite the positive contribution of 
HE qualiications to wages (Cholezas and Tsaklo-
glou, 1999; Magoula and Psacharopoulos, 1999; 
Prodromidis and Prodromidis, 2007). These results 
are in harmony with the trends discussed in sec-
tion two and they further indicate that despite a 
wage premium HE holders might enjoy, this is not 
economically signiicant nor commensurate to the 
qualiications they hold. 
Despite gender disparities favouring male gra-
duates in the labour market, as discussed above, 
private average returns on education were higher 
for women than for men before the crisis (Cho-
lezas and Tsakloglou, 2006; Papapetrou, 2006). 
Speciically, an undergraduate university degree 
(AEI) is associated with a 29% wage premium for 
females and a 24% premium for males (Livanos 
and Pouliakas, 2009). However, gender disparities 
increased after the crisis and differentials in earnings 
and occupational segregation are stark. The gender 
pay gap in 2013 stood at 15% (16,3% in the EU28) 
(Eurostat, 2013) with women over-concentrated in 
areas of the economy with lower returns than men 
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(Livanos and Pouliakas, 2012). This mirrors the less 
risky educational pathways women follow, such as 
humanities and education, which are characterised 
by the lowest wage returns.  
Consistent with previous studies, a degree 
from a traditional university (AEI) is associated with 
a higher premium than one from a Technological 
Institution (TEI) (Livanos and Pouliakas, 2009). In 
addition, wage returns on irst and post-graduate 
qualiications are higher in the private rather than 
in the public sector, though the reverse is the case 
for PhD degrees. Finally, private returns vary con-
siderably depending on degree subject, with social 
sciences graduates enjoying the lowest rate of 
return (3,8% for males versus 6,2% for females). 
By contrast, languages graduates display the high-
est rates of return (9,9% for males and 9,8% for 
females), followed by education graduates (8,9% 
for males versus 9,9% for females).
In line with indings reported in the previous 
section about age differentials, inequalities in 
earnings point to an age-associated penalty that 
disadvantages those at a younger age. Admittedly 
this relates to experience, qualiications and on-
-the-job training rather than age per se and it is 
reversed with occupational maturity. A recent study10 
reported that 71% of graduates aged 30-35 years 
were employed in comparison to just 52% of 18-29 
year olds (kariera.gr, 2016). Income disparity is also 
prevalent between these two groups with 45,6% of 
the latter (18-29 year olds) earning less than 500 
euros per month, compared to 21,3% of the for-
mer group (30-35 year olds). Conversely, a higher 
proportion (47,6%) of 30-35 year olds enjoyed an 
income of 851 euros per month or higher in com-
parison to only 21,4% for those aged 18-29 years. 
Since the onset of the crisis, in-work poverty has 
increased signiicantly across age groups though 
there is a noticeable “shift in poverty from the old 
to the younger generations” (Koutsogeorgopoulou 
et al., 2014: 13), increasing thus the degree of 
precariousness of this age group.
Regarding poverty of the precariat, Greece 
displayed higher levels of poverty than the EU ave-
rage across all educational categories both in 2009 
and 2015. However, HE qualiications do offer some 
protection from poverty. For example, in 2015, at 
the height if the crisis, HE graduates were the least 
likely to be under the poverty line (4,9%) in com-
parison to primary school graduates (28,4%) who 
were adversely affected by the drop in the minimum 
wage and the rise in part-time employment that 
occurred after the crisis (Eurostat, 2016). 
Graduate destinations 
Given the rise in HE graduates (Section 1) amid 
increased uncertainty in terms of employment, career 
and labour market prospects (Section 2), what is 
the full extent of precarity and what the alternatives 
to it do Greek graduates explore? I discuss these 
issues in the remainder of this section.
Skills mismatch of graduates11
A rise in underutilization12 was registered 
between 2004 and 2010 in most EU countries 
(Cedefop, 2012). Over-qualiications and skills 
mismatch in graduate jobs13 was limited, that is to 
say applicable to 10% or less of graduates, only 
in a handful of countries (namely Germany, the 
Netherlands, Slovenia and Switzerland), which inva-
riably put a strong emphasis on vocational training 
(CIPD, 2015). On the other hand, Greece recorded 
both the steepest increase and one of the highest 
rates of graduates in non-graduate jobs with 45% 
of them in 2004 found in jobs that required lower 
qualiications than they possessed. In 2010, this 
rate rose to almost 65%, the second highest rate 
among the surveyed countries. 
According to a different survey based on 
self-reporting of over-education in the labour 
market14 (Eurofound, 2010), an improvement in 
underutilization was registered for the majority of 
surveyed countries with less than 25% of graduates 
reporting underutilization in 2010 in comparison to 
2005. However, in Greece (along with another nine 
countries)15, underutilization was higher than 35%. 
Despite the different methodology of the surveys 
reported above, the underutilization of Greek gra-
duates is unquestionable. 
Brain drain
Emigration of graduates, or “brain drain”, 
is not a new not a uniquely Greek phenomenon. 
However, its upsurge after the crisis has given it 
dimensions of a socio-economic crisis in its own 
right. Apart from the obvious short and medium-
-term ramiications it has for the Greek society and 
economy, its long-term consequences are equally 
deleterious. While youth emigration contributes to 
a reduction in unemployment (see section 2), it has 
detrimental effects on the productive capacity of 
the country and its future prospects. Traditionally, 
Greek emigrants used to be 30 years old or youn-
ger, but with the onset of the crisis a larger than 
ever before proportion among them are older than 
40 years old (12%). Regarding the educational 
background of emigrants, a substantial upgrade has 
occurred over the last few decades Until the 1980s 
Greek emigrants on average used to hold primary 
or middle school certiicate, while during the 1990s 
they possessed high school diploma. Since the new 
millennium, they have been ever higher educated 
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trend has persisted well into the 2010s (Labrianidis 
and Pratsinakis, 2016). 
The number of Greeks aged 15-64 who emi-
grated since 2008, is at least half a million people 
(427,000) (Kathimerini, 2016). At the beginning of 
the crisis, the yearly average of Greek emigration 
was around 30,000 people. However, as the crisis 
deepened and unemployment kept soaring, emi-
gration intensiied and became the chief avenue to 
economic activity for the precariat. In 2013 alone, 
approximately 100,000 Greeks emigrated abroad. 
Figures for 2014 and 2015 point to comparable rates, 
making this wave of migration the third substantial 
and sustained one the country has experienced in 
its modern history16. In other words, the implica-
tions of the crisis for Greece are comparable to the 
major wars in which it participated during the 20th 
century and which largely destroyed the country’s 
infrastructure, productive capacity, economy and 
social fabric.
The motivations for moving abroad, the “pull” 
factors are mainly the pursuit of better working 
conditions, increased employment prospects and 
stability. On the other hand, the main “push factors” 
behind the Greek post-2008 emigration are unem-
ployment, poor job prospects, low remuneration 
and relative deprivation (Triandafyllidou and Gropas, 
2014), that is to say the ensemble of employment 
and labour market features that accompany pre-
carity. For example, half of those who left Greece 
after 2010 were unemployed prior to emigration 
and a large proportion of them were economically 
inactive or underemployed for several months or 
years before emigration.
Arguably, the “brain-drain” has affected Greece 
for at least the last 100 years (Psacharopoulos and 
Tassoulas, 2004). For, there is another dimension to 
it, which has to do with student migration. Before the 
crisis Greece was one of the world’s prime “expor-
ters” of students to other countries, which has had 
a negative effect on the balance of payments and 
nurtured the “brain drain”. Characteristically, “in 
2007, proportional to its size, Greece had the highest 
proportion of students studying abroad in comparison 
to any other country in the world” (Themelis, 2013: 
84). Despite the signiicant reduction in the relevant 
rates in comparison to the pre-crisis levels, there 
is still a high proportion of Greek students (5,8%) 
who study abroad17. At any rate, student migration 
peaked in 2007, when it exceeded 51,000 students. 
Since then, it has been diminishing (22,000 students 
in 2012) (ICEF, 2013). 
NEETs18
The amount of young people not engaged in 
any form of employment, education or training has 
increased due to the crisis in most EU countries with 
the notable exceptions of Germany, Sweden and the 
UK. Speciically, among the 15–24 year-old group, 
NEETs in the EU increased from 10,9% in 2008 to 
13% in 2013 (Eurofound, 2016). Since then, this 
rate has been falling steadily (12% or 6.6 million 
young people in 2015) (Eurostat, 2015). However, 
large disparities exist among EU countries with the 
North displaying much better rates (e.g. 4,7% in 
the Netherlands, 6,2% in Denmark and Germany 
and 6,7% in Sweden) than the South (e.g. 15,6% 
in Spain, 17,2% in Greece, 19,3% in Bulgaria and 
21,4% in Italy).
In terms of gender, more females are NEETs 
than males in most EU countries. In 2000, the 
female-male gap among those aged 15-24 years 
was 3,4% although it subsequently dropped to 0,9 
in 2011 (Eurofound, 2012) and 0,6% in 201519. 
In a host of South European countries, includ-
ing Greece, the proportion of NEETs increased 
signiicantly since the onset of the crisis, together 
with youth unemployment. In 2008, 11,4% of all 
15-24 year olds in Greece were classiied as NEETs 
(Eurostat, 2016). This rate continued to rise until 
2013 when it peaked at 20,4%. Since then, is has 
been decreasing steadily and in 2015 it stood at 
17,2% (Eurostat, 2016). In most EU countries, the 
rise of NEETs during the crisis is an outcome of the 
upsurge in youth unemployment rather than eco-
nomic inactivity. In Greece, around 70% of NEETs 
were unemployed but active20 (European Commis-
sion, 2015). The broad characteristics of the Greek 
NEETs are as follows: more often than not female, 
between 20-24 years old, of Greek origin, medium 
to high educational attainment (including HE gradu-
ates), with some work experience, from low income 
families, without prior training programme attain-
ment, supported by their family and often without 
social insurance (Drakaki et al., 2014).
Another key feature of the Greek NEETs is the 
higher than the EU average proportion of HE gradu-
ates among them. Speciically, more than a quarter of 
15-24 years old NEETs are HE graduates, in contrast 
to most EU countries where a higher proportion of 
NEETS are low skilled (Eurofound, 2012). In addition, 
Greek NEETs in the same age group (15-24 years 
old), seem to come from low income families, which 
is associated with high rates of intergenerational 
transmission of poverty (see Papatheodorou and 
Papanastasiou, 2010). Evidently, higher education 
qualiications in Greece do not shield their holders 
from entering the NEET category, though they seem 
to offer some protection from poverty.
Conclusion
This paper discussed the transition from higher 
education into the labour market among young gra-
duates, focusing on the period from approximately 
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2000 to date. It identiied a number of trends. First, 
this transition is protracted and not completed for 
the majority of graduates until their thirties. Second, 
the labour market is fragmented along education 
level, place of living (urban or non-urban), gender, 
age and ethnic lines. Third, higher education does 
not seem to play a socially integrative role, as it 
does not offer any shield against unemployment, 
emigration and precariousness. Fourth, the crisis has 
exacerbated enduring problems integral to higher 
education and its weak connections with the labour 
market. I will elaborate on these trends and offer 
some explanation.
During the crisis, the availability of highly ski-
lled graduates intensiied competition for the fewer 
jobs that were on offer as the public sector shrunk 
and the private did not recuperate the job losses it 
sustained due redundancies imposed by the lack of 
investment and reduced proitability. However, the 
traditional orientation of higher education towards 
the public sector (Kanellopoulos et al., 2003) did not 
alter accentuating therefore the mismatch between 
the production of graduates and the labour market 
capacity to absorb them (Karamessini, 2008; Liagou-
ras et al., 2003). What is more, the crisis dismantled 
the foundations of the Greek labour market and 
created an attendant social crisis, which severely 
affects its highly educated youth and curtails their 
employment prospects. 
However, in the Greek case at least, some cau-
tion has to be exercised in the explanatory power of 
the crisis as a set of chronic issues and dificulties, 
inherent within the Greek higher education system 
and the graduate labour market has been operating 
well before the crisis. These issues include low levels 
of degree completion, high graduate unemployment 
and low returns on education (OECD, 2008). In 
particular, the labour market has been a notoriously 
tough and unpredictable environment within which 
to operate and it has traditionally reserved low levels 
of economic activity, especially among females, 
very high rates of self-employment (Papadopoulos, 
2000) and above average unemployment rates for 
university graduates (Livanos, 2010). Moreover, it 
has invariably allowed various barriers in its smooth 
and fair operation, such as clientelism, nepotism and 
lack of meritocracy (Themelis, 2013). The economy 
itself has been lacking in dynamism since the end 
of the Second World War as well as in investment 
in sectors with productive capacity. Moreover, it has 
customarily operated with short-termism in relation 
to economic and infrastructural planning, it has been 
traditionally displaying economic rigidities (Pagou-
latos, 2003), dependency on the EU and external 
funding, and it has succumbed to the free market 
dogma without maintaining its distinctiveness and 
competitive advantages that could generate and 
sustain employment opportunities for the ever rising 
numbers of highly educated people. Furthermore, 
there has traditionally been a supply and demand 
problem in the skilled jobs market, which is more 
pronounced among females, non-native born people 
and those living outside the main urban centres. 
While emigration seems to offer some relief to the 
“opportunity-starved” young graduates, it also drains 
the country from talent and resources (Labrianidis 
and Pratsinakis, 2016). 
To conclude, this paper has alluded to a key 
trend underpinning the interface between higher 
education and the labour market. As the number and 
proportion of qualiied people increased signiicantly 
after the 1990s, their prospects diminished equally 
markedly. Before the crisis, Greece was losing out 
on talent and private capital as high demand for 
HE was not met by domestic institutions, thusly 
forcing the Greek family to fund their offspring 
studies abroad. However, high numbers of those 
highly educated and trained abroad would eventually 
return home in order to enter the labour market 
with better prospects. In this way, Greece seems 
to have beneited from a “brain gain” that lasted up 
until the onset of the crisis. Conversely, after the 
crisis demand for HE has been met by Greek insti-
tutions but Greece is now losing out both on talent 
who emigrate upon graduation but also on public 
capital in the form of HE expenditure foregone for 
those who emigrate abroad. This trend points to a 
signiicant “brain drain”. At any rate, the multiple 
and overlapping problems underlying the transition 
from higher education to the labour market is at the 
crux of the economic and political problems Greece 
is facing and they point to a ticking bomb at the 
foundations of the Greek society.
Notes
 1 Well above Italy (18%), France (19%), Portugal (23%), 
Spain (24%) and Germany (27%), but below Finland 
(30%), the Netherlands (34%), Ireland (34%), the UK 
(34%) and Belgium (38%).
 2 Averages need some caution, as they mask wide variation 
in national rates between high and low performers. On one 
hand, there is a handful of countries (namely Lithuania, 
Cyprus, Ireland, Luxembourg and the UK) with rates 
very close to or higher than the 50% threshold. On the 
other hand, another relatively small group of countries, 
including Germany, Czech Republic, Malta, Romania 
and Italy, are concentrated at or below the 30% mark. 
However, a majority of 17 countries including Greece, 
achieve a slightly higher than average rate than the EU.
 3 Italy (10,3%), Spain (12,3%) and Ireland (13,5%) exhi-
bited a higher attainment gap than Greece but close to 
the EU28 average, while Portugal (16,9%) had a much 
higher gap. 
 4 Refers to people aged 20-34 who left education between 
one and three years before the reference year.
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 6 Consistent with indings from the two previous annual 
surveys conducted by the same organisation in 2014 and 
2015, the three more important priorities young people 
set in terms of occupational selection are personal and 
professional development, remuneration and working 
environment. Expectedly, the majority of the respondents 
reported that the crisis has had a negative impact on 
their personal life and their perception of labour (kariera.
gr, 2016).
 7 What is more, working conditions in the public sector 
have deteriorated even in critical areas. For example, 
the situation in public hospitals has reached dangerously 
low levels, with long queues for patients, long working 
hours for professionals, often with minimal resources 
to operate or offer irst aid, overcrowding of wards, and 
shortages of doctors, nurses and medical and paramedical 
personnel. 
 8 In all EU countries, apart from Malta, Denmark and 
Germany, youth unemployment increased during the 
crisis. In a handful of countries, youth unemployment 
sky-rocketed, most notably in Cyprus and Greece, but 
also in Italy, Spain, Portugal and Croatia. 
 9 Greek HE has two tracks. The irst consists of the “AEIs” 
and is made up of the traditional universities, the so-
-called polytechnics (no remembrance with the British 
polytechnics), the Schools of Fine Art and the Open Uni-
versity. The second, “TEIs”, consists of the Technological 
Education Institutions (TEI) and the School of Pedagogic 
and Technological Education.
10 This is an annual, national study which was last conduc-
ted in spring 2016 across a sample of over 5,000 18-35 
year-old HE students and graduates.
11 Data on skills mismatch of graduates needs to be treated 
with some caution as it is based on two distinct metho-
dologies.
12 Underutilization here is measured as years in education 
and is deined as graduates working in jobs that require 
lower qualiications than they possess. The latter, qua-
liications, are measured as years in education.
13 By “graduate jobs”, it was meant jobs obtained after 
15-16 years of education.
14 Surveys based on “objective indicators”, such as years in 
education, do not take into account the upgrade in jobs 
over the years and variation in new graduates’ qualiica-
tions in relation to market changes. Surveys based on 
“subjective indicators”, such as self-reporting, rely on 
graduates’ own assessment of skills required for the job 
they perform. While this measurement is not immune 
from shortcomings, such the usefulness of perceptions 
of skills as a comparable criterion, the culturally-varied 
meaning of underutilization and so on, it still provides 
some useful insights into graduates’ own assessment 
of their own employment situation in relation to their 
qualiications. 
15 These countries were Croatia, France, Hungary, Latvia, 
Luxembourg, Romania, Slovenia, Spain and the United 
Kingdom.
16 The other two namely, the 1903-1917 and the 1960-
1972 ones, occurred after the First and Second World 
War respectively.
17 Approximately one in three of them chooses the UK and 
one in seven Germany.
18 NEETs are deined as those young people under 30 years 
old not engaged in employment, education or training.
19 Average rates disguise cross-country variation with some 
member states recording a 10% gender gap. For example, 
in the Czech Republic, Malta, Germany, Hungary, Romania 
and the UK, approximately 55% of NEETs were women 
whereas in a handful of countries the same proportion 
of NEETs were men (i.e. Luxembourg, Finland, Croatia 
and Cyprus).
20 By contrast, in Bulgaria, Italy and Romania the majority 
of NEETs were inactive rather than unemployed.
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